

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:	NO.
C/PP	V-237
	DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. DD/P				MSL	
2. SR/CP				MGN.	
3. I					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9. SR/1	MAY	7	1953	agawp	
10. CA/CRU					
11. EP/TS					
12.					
13. CA/B1	2 E 13				
14.					
15.					

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Declassify
R.O. 6 Aug 72
date: cite
coordinate
if applicable.

to 11: please change your records to show this changed to CA/B1. Thanks. f. Smith
no longer controls these documents.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 8828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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27 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT : QKACTIVE

REFERENCE : Attached memorandum from SR Division, Subject: Background Information for Meeting with Admiral Stevens at 2 P.M., 27 February 1953, Central Administration Building.

1. Before commenting on the five major questions referred to in the reference, it is felt that certain undisputed facts about QKACTIVE should be emphasized. The project is three years old and has, to date, been able to accomplish little or nothing. Through December, 1952, over two million dollars had been spent in an effort to develop operational assets. At present the administrative situation, particularly in Germany, is seriously out of joint including considerable evidence of incompetence of personnel as well as intramural personality conflicts. The scripts prepared for use by the radio station have unanimously been considered inadequate, and Admiral Stevens has given indications that he does not wish to be bothered with management responsibilities which seem unavoidably his. In this connection reference is made to his desire to change his contract to permit him to move to Annapolis, plus his specific instructions to the field that on his trip abroad he is to be protected from any controversial personalities or issues. In addition, Admiral Stevens has been reluctant to take direction from the SR Division. Consequently, command channels are ambiguous and appropriate management controls do not exist. In order to resolve the above difficulties, which are felt to be serious, it is urged that the following points be made decisively with Admiral Stevens. The points are the same as those discussed in the reference mentioned above. *understandably!*

a. A task force to review QKACTIVE should be appointed. Speedy action should be required and the task force should limit its functions to a reexamination of the mission, a re-evaluation of the concept of emigre unity, and an analysis of the desirability of retaining the project as is or possibly reducing the activities. The task force should not affect or in any way delay action suggested below to review administrative difficulties.

b. Action to be taken on Radio Liberation. The proposed March 1 opening date should definitely be postponed at least

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until the administrative difficulties have been straightened out and adequate scripts prepared (i.e., both in quantity and in quality). No decision as to opening date should be made officially without first obtaining DD/P's approval upon recommendation from the SR Division.

c. Admiral Stevens' trip to Europe. The Admiral should take his trip not later than March 5 since it is essential that he face up to his management responsibilities. He should take with him on the trip a representative of the SR Division designated by ☐ so that the Division can be informed of the situation in Germany and can be directly familiar with all discussions and decisions. The Admiral should concern himself with the administrative situation, with the desirability of discharging certain personnel and with the problems of improving the European staff.

d. Amendment of Admiral Stevens' contract. The only comment on this subject is, that under no circumstances should the Admiral be permitted to shift his residence back to Annapolis since it is not believed that he cannot possibly give the operation sufficiently close supervision without being full time in New York. At least no move should occur until the present situation has been materially corrected.

e. Administrative control of the project. Administrative corrections along the line of the ☐ report should be immediately instituted. The relationships between the SR Division and the Admiral's office should be clarified and the staff situation, particularly in Germany, should be reviewed and corrected with top priority as indicated above.

2. The above decisions are considered the minimum necessary. If the Admiral considers them too drastic or unacceptable, it is felt that the question of continuing the Admiral in his present position should be seriously considered. The PP Staff believes that insistence on the conditions is more important than continuing the Admiral, although it appreciates the seriousness of the loss of his services plus his many unique qualifications for the post. It seems more important at the moment to clarify management and operating difficulties than to resolve the intricate intellectual problems.

☐

C. TRACY BARNES
Chief

Political and Psychological Warfare

Attachment
As described
in Reference

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If it is worth it, it could be left strongly?

Jerry Meyer discuss from and cover to be an adequate administrator. Jim King - a very able administrator.

Under the contract.